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THE ADMISSIBILITY OF GRAND JURY
TESTIMONY UNDER 804(b)(5): A TWO-
TEST PROPOSAL
I. INTRODUCTION
The common law rule against hearsay precludes the admission into
evidence of out-of-court statements offered to establish the truth of the
matter asserted.' The hearsay rule is designed to prevent the trier of fact
from considering unreliable evidence. 2 By excluding many reliable out-
of-court statements from trial, however, the hearsay rule also obstructs
the trier of fact's determination of the truth.3 Consequently, courts be-
gan to admit reliable out-of-court statements into evidence notwith-
standing the hearsay rule.4 After a time, these reliable statements
became well-established exceptions to the rule against hearsay.
5
In 1975, Congress enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence 6 to pro-
mote uniform evidentiary rulings among the federal courts.7 Rules 803
and 804 catalogue the hearsay exceptions permitted in federal trials.8
Rule 804(b)(5) is the residual or "catch-all" hearsay exception that al-
l See 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1362 (j. Chadbourne rev. 1974); C. MCCORMICK, EVI-
DENCE § 246 (2d ed. 1972).
2 5J. WIGMORE,supra note 1, at § 1362; C. MCCORMICK, .upra note 1, at § 245. McCor-
mick states that the rule against hearsay ensures that witnesses testify under three ideal condi-
tions: under oath, in the personal presence of the trier of fact, and subject to cross-
examination. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at § 245. Wigmore emphasizes that the hearsay
rule excludes only noncross-examined statements. 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, at § 1362.
Consequently, a previously cross-examined statement (such as a deposition or former trial
testimony) is not hearsay according to Wigmore. Id. at § 1370.
3 See 5 J. WIGMORE, SUpra note 1, at §§ 1420, 1427.
4 Id. Wigmore notes that two considerations underlie the exceptions to the hearsay rule.
First, according to the necessity principle, courts should admit hearsay only when no better
evidence is available for trial. Id. at § 1421. Second, under the circumstantial probability of
trustworthiness principle, courts should admit hearsay when circumstances indicating the
probable reliability of the statement can substitute for the test of cross-examination. Id. at
§ 1422.
5 For a general history of the development of the hearsay rule and its exceptions, see id.
at §§ 1364, 1426.
6 Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (88 Stat.)
2215.
7 H.R. REP. No. 650, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 7075.
8 FED. R. EVID. 803 & 804. Rule 803 lists 24 hearsay exceptions that courts may use to
admit hearsay irrespective of the hearsay declarant's availability to testify at trial. The five
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lows federal judges to admit reliable non-excepted hearsay as substan-
tive evidence when the hearsay declarant is unavailable to testify at
trial.9 Congress enacted Rule 804(b)(5) to prevent federal judges from
stretching the specifically enumerated hearsay exceptions beyond their
intended scope and to provide for the admission into evidence of reliable
non-excepted hearsay in exceptional circumstances. 10
Grand jury testimony offered as substantive evidence at trial is
hearsay because it is an out-of-court statement offered to establish the
truth of the matter asserted." Because no specific hearsay exception for
grand jury testimony exists in the federal rules, federal judges must ex-
clude grand jury testimony from trial under Rule 80212 unless the testi-
mony is sufficiently reliable to meet the requirements of a residual
hearsay exception.' 3 The Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuit Courts of
Appeals have held that corroborated grand jury testimony meets the
requirements of Rule 804(b)(5).' 4 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,
hearsay exceptions enumerated in Rule 804 apply only when the hearsay declarant is unavail-
able to testify at trial.
9 FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(5) states:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a
witness:
(5) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing excep-
tions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court
determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the state-
ment is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which
the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of
these rules and the interests ofjustice will best be served by admission of the statement
into evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this exception unless
the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial
or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, his
intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address
of the declarant.
10 See S. REP. No. 1277, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 19, repinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 7051, 7065; see also infia note 121.
1 See FED. R. EVID. 801(c). Rule 801(c) defines hearsay as "a statement, other than one
made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the
truth of the matter asserted."
12 FED. R. EvID. 802 provides that "hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these
rules or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority or by
Act of Congress."
13 Two residual or"catch-all" hearsay exceptions exist in the federal rules. Rule 804(b) (5)
applies only when the hearsay declarant is unavailable for trial. Rule 803(24) applies when
the declarant's availability to testify at trial is immaterial.
This Comment addresses only the admissibility of grand jury testimony of an unavaila-
ble declarant under 804(b)(5). Federal courts have admitted grand jury testimony at trial as
substantive evidence when the declarant is available to testify. See, e.g., United States v.
Mingoia, 424 F.2d 710 (2d Cir. 1970); United States v. Insana, 423 F.2d 1165 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 841 (1970); United States v. De Sisto, 329 F.2d 929 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 979 (1964).
14 United States v. Murphy, 696 F.2d 282 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v. Walker, 696
F.2d 277 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v. Barlow, 693 F.2d 954 (6th Cir. 1982); United
COMMENTS
however, has held that grand jury testimony does not meet the require-
ments of Rule 804(b)(5). 15 The Supreme Court has yet to grant certio-
rari to resolve this dispute.
In addition to the hearsay issue, a potential violation of the sixth
amendment Confrontation Clause exists when courts admit grand jury
testimony of a declarant who is unavailable to testify at trial. The Con-
frontation Clause guarantees defendants the right to cross-examine their
accusers at trial.' 6 Because grand jury investigations are not adversarial
proceedings, 17 defense counsel does not cross-examine adverse witnesses
before grand juries.'8 Consequently, when a grand jury declarant is un-
available for trial, the defendant is deprived of the constitutional right
to test the accuracy of the testimony by cross-examining the declarant.
This Comment proposes two tests to aid federal judges in determin-
ing whether an unavailable witness's grand jury testimony is sufficiently
reliable to admit under Rule 804(b)(5). The procedural test requires
that the grand jury testimony conform to trial evidentiary rules. The
corroborative test requires that sufficient independent evidence exist to
support the truth of the grand jury testimony. The grand jury testi-
mony must pass both tests before the judge can admit the testimony into
evidence under 804(b)(5).
This Comment demonstrates that the procedural and corroborative
tests would resolve the disagreement among the federal courts about
whether to admit grand jury testimony into trial under 804(b)(5).
Moreover, the two tests also would ensure that all grand jury testimony
admitted under 804(b)(5) satisfies the Supreme Court's sixth amend-
States v. Garner, 574 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 936 (1978); United States v.
West, 574 F.2d 1131 (4th Cir. 1978); United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346 (8th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977); see also United States v. Mastrangelo, 533 F. Supp. 389
(E.D.N.Y.), remanded on other grounds, 693 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1982).
15 United States v. Gonzalez, 559 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1977); see also United States v. Tur-
ner, 475 F. Supp. 194 (E.D. Mich. 1978). The Fifth Circuit has strongly suggested in dicta
that even corroborated grand jury testimony can never meet the Rule 804(b) (5) requirements.
United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 629 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2300 (1982).
16 See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968);
Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965).
The Confrontation Clause of the sixth amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prose-
cutions, the accused shall enjoy the right. . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him
.... .U.S  CONsT. amend. VI.
17 Garner v. United States, 439 U.S. 936, 938 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting), denying cert.
to 574 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir.); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974); Campbell,
Eliminate the GrandJug, 64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 174, 177 (1973); M. FRANKEL & G.
NAFTALIS, THE GRAND JURY: AN INSTITUTION ON TRIAL 26, 67 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
FRANKEL, THE GRAND JURY].
18 FRANKEL, THE GRAND JURY, supira note 17, at 30. The accused has no right to counsel
at grand jury proceedings. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(d); Rodis, A Lawyer's Guide to GrandJug
Abuse, 14 CRIM. L. BULL. 123, 127 (1978); Campbell, supra note 17, at 177; FRANKEL, THE
GRAND JURY, supra note 17, at 24, 59.
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ment Confrontation Clause standards. Finally, this Comment demon-
strates that the procedural and corroborative tests would be easy to
implement and are consistent with the legislative intent of Rule
804(b) (5).
II. THE SUSPECT RELIABILITY OF GRAND JURY TESTIMONY
Although a federal judge must consider six factors before admitting
grand jury testimony into evidence under 804(b)(5),19 the disagreement
among the federal courts has focused upon one requirement in particu-
lar: the grand jury testimony must contain "equivalent circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness. '20 More specifically, the disagreement is
about what circumstances make grand jury testimony sufficiently relia-
ble for courts to admit it as substantive evidence at trial.
Grand jury testimony contains several inherent guarantees of relia-
bility. The grand jury witness testifies in a formal setting, under oath,
and subject to penalties for perjury.21 The formal setting and the oath
impress upon the witness the seriousness of the proceeding,22 while the
sanctions for perjury threaten the witness with serious consequences for
testifying falsely.
23
Although these factors support the reliability of grand jury testi-
19 First, the hearsay declarant must qualify as an unavailable witness under Rule 804(a).
Second, the hearsay statement must contain equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trust-
worthiness. Third, the proponent of the statement must offer it as evidence of a material fact.
Fourth, the statement must be more probative on the point for which it is offered than any
other evidence reasonably obtainable. Fifth, the admission of the evidence must serve the
general purposes of the Federal Rules of Evidence and the interests of justice. Sixth, the
proponent of the statement must give the adverse party sufficient pre-trial notice of the pro-
ponent's intention to offer the statement at trial. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(5), supra note 9.
20 United States v. Barlow, 693 F.2d 954, 960 (6th Cir. 1982). Compare United States v.
Murphy, 696 F.2d 282 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v. Walker, 696 F.2d 277 (4th Cir. 1982);
United States v. Garner, 574 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 936 (1978); United
States v. West, 574 F.2d 1131 (4th Cir. 1978); United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346 (8th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977); United States v. Mastrangelo, 533 F. Supp. 389
(E.D.N.Y.), remanded on other grounds, 693 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1982) (corroborated grand jury
testimony contains "equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness") with United
States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2300 (1982); United States v.
Gonzalez, 559 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Turner, 475 F. Supp. 194 (E.D.
Mich. 1978) (grand jury testimony does not contain "equivalent circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness').
21 Gamer, 439 U.S. 936, 938 (1978) (Stewart, J. dissenting), dening cert. to 574 F.2d 1141
(4th Cir.); FRANKEL, THE GRAND JURY, supra note 17, at 20, 102; see Carlson, 547 F.2d at
1354; Mastrangelo, 533 F. Supp. at 391.
22 See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970); 56 F.R.D. 183, 288 (1973) (Advisory
Committee's Notes to the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence) [hereinafter cited as Advisory
Committee's Notes].
23 FRANKEL, THE GRAND JURY, supra note 17, at 102. Under federal law, a person guilty
of perjury before a grand jury may be fined up to $2000 or imprisoned for as many as five
years, or both. 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1970).
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mony, courts should not admit all grand jury testimony into evidence
under 804(b) (5) because modern grand jury procedural practices make
the reliability of grand jury testimony highly suspect.2 4 First, the party
seeking the indictment, the prosecutor, typically controls modern grand
jury proceedings. 2 5 The prosecutor determines which witnesses to call,
what evidence to hear, and which criminal violations to consider.2 6 The
prosecutor also explains the applicable law to the grand jury and in-
structs the grand jury on the standard of proof needed to indict.
2 7
Moreover, prosecutors often lead their witnesses and introduce
multiple hearsay at grand jury proceedings because ordinary rules of
evidence do not apply.28 Prosecutors also may threaten, pressure, or har-
ass the grand jury witness to elicit testimony supporting an indict-
ment.29 In United States v. Gonzalez,3° for example, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals refused to admit grand jury testimony under 804(b) (5)
in part because the prosecutor threatened to call the grand jury witness
before successive grand juries and give the witness repeated six-month
24 Admitting all grand jury testimony into evidence also would contravene the legislative
intent of 804(b)(5) to avoid a major judicial revision of the hearsay rule. Thevii, 665 F.2d at
629; see infra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
25 See Campbell, supra note 17, at 177; FRANKEL, THE GRAND JURY, supra note 17, at 4,
21. In fact, the prosecutor may be the only representative of the legal community present at
grand jury proceedings. See FED. R. GRIM. P. 6(d).
26 Campbell, supra note 17, at 177; FRANKEL, THE GRAND JURY, supra note 17, at 21.
27 Campbell, supra note 17, at 177.
28 Gamer, 439 U.S. at 938 (Stewart, J. dissenting), denying cert. to 574 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir.);
FRANKEL, THE GRAND JURY, supra note 17, at 26. The Federal Rules of Evidence do not
apply to grand jury proceedings. FED. R. EVID. 1101(d)(2).
The United States Supreme Court has held that grand jury indictments may be based
wholly on hearsay evidence. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956). The Court stated
that allowing challenges to grand jury indictments based upon the use of incompetent evi-
dence would substantially delay and hinder the grand jury's investigative function. Id at
363-64.
The Supreme Court also has noted that the traditional duty of the grand jury is to
"pursue its investigative and accusatorial functions unimpeded by the evidentiary and proce-
dural restrictions applicable to a criminal trial." United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338,
349 (1974) (refusing to extend the exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings).
Prosecutors may present hearsay evidence to grand juries for several reasons. The prose-
cutor may wish to protect the government's witnesses from potential impeachment at trial by
the disclosure of the witnesses' grand jury transcript. Consequently, the prosecutor will have
"hearsay" witnesses instead of percipient witnesses testify before the grand jury. At the grand
jury stage, the prosecutor may not have had enough time to develop or find evidence to
corroborate the details of the witnesses' testimony. The prosecutor may wish to save taxpay-
ers the expense of bringing in witnesses from distant locations. Finally, the prosecutor may
not wish to impose a burden on the witnesses by forcing them to miss work to testify before
grand juries. F. INBAU, J. THOMPSON, J. HADDAD, J. ZAGEL & G. STARKMAN, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: CASES AND COMMENTS 750 n.1 (2d ed. 1980).
29 See FRANKEL, THE GRAND JURY, supra note 17, at 52-59.
30 559 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1977).
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contempt sentences if he refused to testify.3 ' In short, the prosecutor
"can indict anybody, at any time, for almost anything, before any grand
jury."3
2
Second, because grand jury investigations are not adversarial pro-
ceedings, defense counsel is not present to cross-examine adverse wit-
nesses, give the defendant's version of the story, or expose any
weaknesses in the witnesses' testimony.3 3 A promise of leniency may en-
courage grand jury witnesses to lie or exaggerate their stories to obtain
favorable treatment from the government.3 4 In addition, grand jury
witnesses may lie to protect themselves and their families from physical
harm threatened by the defendant.35 Furthermore, a grand jury witness
31 Id at 1273. In addition, the court noted that the prosecutor elicited the grand jury
witness's testimony through leading questions, defense counsel could not cross-examine the
witness, no evidence corroborated the witness's testimony, and the grand jury witness had an
incentive to testify falsely to protect himself and his family from possible physical reprisals.
Id For further examples of the hopeless plight of grand jury witnesses at the mercy of the
prosecutor, see United States v. Remington, 208 F.2d 567, 571-75 (2d Cir. 1953) (Hand, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 913 (1954); FRANKEL, THE GRAND JURY, supra note 17, at
64-66.
32 Campbell, supra note 17, at 174. Historically, the grand jury protected the accused
from malicious and oppressive prosecution. Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962). To-
day, however, "grand juries have largely lost their function as protectors of individual rights
and have become agents of the prosecution." United States v. Balano, 618 F.2d 624, 627 n.5
(10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 840 (1980); see Rodis, supra note 18, at 139 ("Today, the
protective function of the grand jury has taken secondary importance to its role as an investi-
gative tool of the prosecutor."); FRANKEL, THE GRAND JURY, supra note 17, at 99-100 (grand
juries are "weapons" of the prosecution).
For a general discussion of the historical origins and development of the grand jury sys-
tem, see FRANKEL, THE GRAND JURY, supra note 17, at 6-17.
33 Gamer, 439 U.S. at 938 (Stewart, J., dissenting), denying ce. to 574 F.2d 1141(4th Cir.);
see FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(d). See generally, FRANKEL, THE GRAND JURY, supra note 17, at 18-32.
34 See United States v. Barlow, 693 F.2d 954, 965 (6th Cir. 1982); United States v. Thevis,
665 F.2d 616, 629 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2300 (1982); United States v. Turner, 475
F. Supp. 194, 198 (E.D. Mich. 1978); see also United States v. Mastrangelo, 533 F. Supp. 389
(E.D.N.Y.), remanded on other grounds, 693 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1982), where the court found the
witness's grand jury testimony to be reliable, in part because the witness was not under inves-
tigation for the crime nor under a grant of immunity. 533 F. Supp. at 391. But see United
States v. Garner, 574 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 936 (1978) and United States
v. West, 574 F.2d 1131 (4th Cir. 1978), where the courts admitted corroborated grand jury
testimony under 804(b) (5) even though the grand jury witnesses had entered into plea bar-
gaining or leniency arrangements with the government.
35 See, e.g., Thevir, 665 F.2d at 624 (defendant killed grand jury witness to prevent him
from testifying at trial); United States v. Balano, 618 F.2d 624, 626, 629-30 (10th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 840 (1980) (even after being imprisoned for contempt, grand jury witness
refused to testify because of defendant's threats); Tolbert v. Jago, 607 F.2d 753, 754 (6th Cir.
1979) (grand jury witness was threatened and shot in the head before trial); Garner, 574 F.2d
at 1143 (co-conspirators may have pressured grand jury witness into not testifying); United
States v. Gonzalez, 559 F.2d 1271, 1273 (5th Cir. 1977) (grand jury witness had an incentive
to testify falsely because of fear of physical harm); United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346,
1352-53 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977) (even after being sentenced to jail for
contempt, grand jury witness refused to testify at trial because of defendant's threats).
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may make accusations in a grand jury investigation that the witness
would not make in the presence of the accused.
36
Finally, no complete investigation into the truth of the testimony
occurs in grand jury proceedings because grand juries merely determine
whether probable cause exists to indict the defendant for a crime; grand
juries do not determine a defendant's guilt.
3 7
Nevertheless, the grand jury testimony of an unavailable witness
may be crucial and necessary at trial to convict a defendant of a crime.38
The Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeals have held that
sufficiently corroborated grand jury testimony meets the requirements
of Rule 804(b) (5). 39 In United States v. West,4° for example, the Fourth
Circuit upheld the admission of the grand jury testimony of a witness
who was murdered before trial. In return for leniency on a pending
drug charge and parole violation, the witness had cooperated with po-
lice by purchasing heroin from the defendants. The witness testified
about the heroin purchases before the grand jury. The court found that
the witness's grand jury testimony contained "equivalent circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness" because of the exceptional corroboration
of the testimony: the police searched the witness for drugs immediately
preceding and following the heroin deals; the police constantly observed
the witness except when he was concealed from their view in a building;
the police photographed the witness with one of the defendants; the po-
lice tape recorded the heroin transactions with a hidden transmitter;
and the witness prepared and signed detailed statements immediately
following each heroin purchase.4 1 In other cases, federal courts have
found sufficient corroboration to admit grand jury testimony under
36 West, 574 F.2d at 1141 (Widener, J., dissenting); see Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63
n.6 (1980); 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE 1 800[01], at 800-10
(198 1) [hereinafter cited as WEINSTEIN'S EvIDENCE]; Advisory Committee's Notes, supra note
22, at 288.
37 West, 574 F.2d at 1141 (Widener, J., dissenting); see Campbell, supra note 17, at 177;
FRANKEL, THE GRAND JURY, supra note 17, at 19 ("all grand juries have a common func-
tion: to determine if there is sufficient evidence to warrant putting the subject of an investiga-
tion on trial, where the question of guilt or innocence can be determined").
38 See United States v. Thomas, 705 F.2d 709, 711 (4th Cir. 1983) (the government's case
against the defendants for illegal importation of marijuana "rested largely" on the grand jury
testimony of a boat crew member and a commercial fisherman who could not be found to
testify at trial); United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1354 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431
U.S. 914 (1977) (unavailable drug distributor's grand jury testimony was crucial to the gov-
ernment's case against the defendant because no other individual could testify regarding the
purchase of cocaine from the defendant); cf. United States v. Turner, 475 F. Supp. 194, 203
(E.D. Mich. 1978) (deceased witness's grand jury testimony implicating the defendant in a
cocaine smuggling conspiracy would have had a "devastating effect on the defendant's case").
39 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
40 574 F.2d 1131 (4th Cir. 1978).
41 Id. at 1133-35.
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804(b) (5) in the grand jury witness's firsthand knowledge,42 in the wit-
ness's prior and subsequent affirmance of the grand jury testimony,43 in
the testimony of another witness,44 and in travel45 and business
records.
46
On the other hand, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has strongly
suggested that even corroborated grand jury testimony is too unreliable
to admit because of modern grand jury procedural practices. 4 7 No fed-
eral court that has admitted corroborated grand jury testimony under
804(b) (5) has specifically considered the suspect reliability of grand jury
testimony.
III. THE PROCEDURAL AND CORROBORATIVE TESTS
Federal courts need a standard that takes into consideration the
suspect reliability of grand jury testimony, yet allows for the admission
of reliable grand jury testimony as substantive evidence at trial. The use
of the procedural and corroborative tests would provide such a stan-
dard. Under the procedural test, the grand jury testimony must con-
form to trial evidentiary rules. Under the corroborative test, sufficient
independent evidence must exist to support the truth of the grand jury
testimony. Only if the testimony satisfies both tests should federal courts
42 United States v. Barlow, 693 F.2d 954, 962 (6th Cir. 1982); Carlson, 547 F.2d at 1354;
United States v. Mastrangelo, 533 F. Supp. 389, 391 (E.D.N.Y.), remandedon other grounds, 693
F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1982); see United States v. Walker, 696 F.2d 277, 280 (4th Cir. 1982).
43 Carlson, 547 F.2d at 1354; Aastrangelo, 533 F. Supp. at 391. But cf United States v.
Walker, 696 F.2d 277 (4th Cir. 1982) (the court admitted corroborated grand jury testimony
at trial even though the grand jury witness had written a letter to the United States Attorney
denying the truth of his testimony); United States v. Garner, 574 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 936 (1978) (the court admitted corroborated grand jury testimony at trial
under 804(b)(5) even though the witness had recanted his grand jury testimony).
One commentator cast doubt on the reliability of the evidence corroborating the grand
jury testimony in West and Garner. See Note, Applicahility of Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)e(5) to
Grandjugv Testimony-United States v. Garner, 15 WAKE FoREsT L. REv. 416 (1979). In West,
the grand jury witness was motivated to state what the prosecutor wanted to hear to stay out
of prison. Id. at 424. In Gamer, the principal corroborator of the grand jury testimony was an
accomplice who may have wished to shift the blame for the crime to the defendant. Id. at
426.
44 United States v. Murphy, 696 F.2d 282, 286 (4th Cir. 1982); Walker, 696 F.2d at 280-81;
Gamer, 574 F.2d at 1144.
45 Gamer, 574 F.2d at 1144-45.
46 Mastrangelo, 533 F. Supp. at 391.
47 See United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2300 (1982).
The court noted that a grand jury witness is "not subjected to the vigorous truth testing of
cross-examination"; moreover, the grant of immunity often given to grand jury witnesses
might encourage the witnesses to "embellish" their stories. Id. at 629. Because the defendant
had killed the grand jury witness to keep him from testifying at trial, however, the court held
that the defendant had waived his right to any hearsay or confrontation objection and admit-
ted the grand jury testimony at trial. Id. at 624, 630.
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admit an unavailable witness's grand jury testimony at trial under
804(b) (5).
Use of the procedural test would ensure that federal courts admit
only grand jury testimony given under conditions closely approximating
those at trial. Because prosecutors may not lead their witnesses or
threaten any witnesses at trial,48 the procedural test would prohibit the
admission of grand jury testimony elicited by leading questions or
threats. Similarly, because the hearsay rule bars non-excepted hearsay
from admission at trial,49 the procedural test would prohibit the admis-
sion of grand jury testimony containing non-excepted hearsay. There-
fore, use of the procedural test would preclude most unreliable grand
jury testimony from entering trial as substantive evidence.50 In United
States v. Gonzalez,-5 1 for example, use of the procedural test automatically
would have protected the defendant from the use of the unreliable
grand jury testimony by excluding the testimony from trial. Thus, the
procedural test would prevent prosecutors from circumventing trial evi-
dentiary rules by introducing otherwise inadmissible testimony into trial
through the 804(b)(5) hearsay exception.
5 2
48 See FED. R. EVID. 611(a)(3): "The court shall exercise reasonable control over the
mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to. . . (3) protect
witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment." See also Advisory Committee's Notes,
supra note 22, at 274 ("the trial judge should protect the witness from questions which 'go
beyond the bounds of proper cross-examination merely to harass, annoy or humiliate ...
(quoting Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 694 (1931))).
See FED. R. EvID. 611 (c): "Leading questions should not be used on the direct examina-
tion of a witness except as may be necessary to develop his testimony." Leading questions are
prohibited on direct examination because they might distort the truth of the witness's an-
swers. United States v. Gonzalez, 559 F.2d 1271, 1273 (5th Cir. 1977). The Advisory Com-
mittee's Notes state that the exceptions to the general prohibition against leading questions
on direct examination include instances when the witness is hostile, unwilling, or biased;
when the witness is a child or an adult with communication problems; when the witness's
recollection is exhausted; and when the questions concern undisputed preliminary matters.
Advisory Commitee's Notes, supra note 22, at 275-76; see also 3 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, at
§§ 774-778.
49 See FED. R. EVID. 802, supra note 12.
50 The procedural test would not impede prosecutors' efforts to obtain grand jury indict-
ments. The prosecutor could continue to ask leading questions and introduce hearsay in
grand jury proceedings. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349 (1974); Costello v.
United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956); see also supra note 28. The procedural test would only
protect defendants from the use of the unreliable grand jury testimony at trial.
51 559 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1977); see supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
52 In Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956), the Supreme Court refused to extend
trial evidentiary rules to grand jury proceedings. See supra note 28. The Court reasoned that
the rules of evidence would adequately protect the defendant at the subsequent trial. Id. at
364. Admitting grand jury testimony at trial under 804(b) (5), however, thwarts the protec-
tions of the rules of evidence by permitting the prosecutor to use as substantive evidence
testimony taken in violation of the rules of evidence. The procedural test closes this loophole
by requiring, as a prerequisite for admission under Rule 804(b) (5), that the grand jury testi-
mony conform to trial evidentiary rules.
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Under the corroborative test, courts would admit grand jury testi-
mony that passes the procedural test only if independent evidence exists
to corroborate the truth of the testimony.53 The corroborative test also
would protect the defendant from the use of unreliable grand jury testi-
mony at trial by ensuring that the testimony admitted under 804(b)(5)
is based on independently verifiable facts. Examples of corroborative
evidence include tape recordings, photographs, signed statements, police
observations, and testimony of other witnesses.
54
Federal courts must use both the procedural and corroborative tests
to ensure that the grand jury testimony is sufficiently reliable to admit
at trial under Rule 804(b)(5). Although the use of the procedural test
would reduce much of the unreliability of grand jury testimony, the tes-
timony still may be unreliable because a promise of leniency or a fear of
physical harm may have encouraged the witness to testify falsely.55 Fur-
thermore, defense counsel has not cross-examined the witness to test the
accuracy of the grand jury testimony.
56
Similarly, use of the corroborative test alone would not ensure that
only reliable grand jury testimony is admitted into evidence under
804(b) (5). First, the corroborative test does not solve the problem of the
suspect reliability of grand jury testimony. Although independent evi-
dence might exist to support the truth of the testimony, the prosecutor
may have threatened or otherwise led the witness to testify consistently
with the corroborative evidence. 57 Second, use of the corroborative test
alone would not resolve the conflict in the federal courts because the
53 Courts may require corroboration to give evidence added reliability. See generally, 7 J.
WIGMORE, supra note 1, at §§ 2056-2075. Under Rule 804(b) (3), statements against interest
which expose the declarant to criminal liability and which are offered at trial to exculpate the
accused must be corroborated. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3). The drafters added the corrobora-
tion requirement to give the statement greater reliability and trustworthiness. See H.R. REP.
No. 650, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 15-16, repinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7075,
7089-90; 4 WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE, supra note 36, 804(b) (3)[01], at 804-92. The corrobora-
tion requirement accommodates two competing interests: first, the high risk of fabrication
when a declarant who will not testify at trial makes a statement exculpating the accused; and
second, the likely reliability of a statement exposing the declarant to criminal punishment.
Advisory Committee's Notes, supra note 22, at 327.
Similar competing interests exist when courts decide whether to admit grand jury testi-
mony that passes the procedural test under 804(b)(5). The testimony tends to be reliable
because it conforms with trial evidentiary rules. On the other hand, the testimony may be
unreliable because no party cross-examined the witness, or because a promise of leniency or a
fear of physical harm may have induced the witness to lie. The corroborative test gives the
grand jury testimony the necessary additional reliability to accommodate these competing
interests.
54 See upra text accompanying notes 41-46. For a discussion of the standard of corrobora-
tion that trial judges should use, see infra note 120 and accompanying text.
55 See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
56 See supra text accompanying note 33.
57 See supra text accompanying notes 28-3 1.
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Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has strongly suggested that corroborated
grand jury testimony is never sufficiently reliable to admit under
804(b) (5) 58
Finally, without the procedural test, federal courts would have to
require a very stringent corroboration standard to overcome the possible
procedural irregularities in the grand jury testimony. A stringent cor-
roboration standard, however, would destroy the utility of admitting
grand jury testimony under Rule 804(b) (5). Proponents of the grand
jury testimony seldom would be able to meet a corroboration standard
that is too strict.59 Furthermore, even if the proponent could meet a
strict corroboration standard, the courts might not admit the testimony
under 804(b) (5) because the increased corroboration indicates a reduced
need for the testimony at trial.6° Therefore, federal courts must use both
the procedural and corroborative tests to adequately protect a defend-
ant at trial from the admission of unreliable grand jury testimony.
The procedural and corroborative tests would ensure that grand
jury testimony admitted at trial meets the 804(b)(5) requirement of
"equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness." Federal
courts have uniformly interpreted "equivalent circumstantial guaran-
tees of trustworthiness" to mean guarantees of trustworthiness
equivalent to those of the other Rule 804(b) hearsay exceptions. 6' The
58 United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 629 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2300 (1982);
see supra note 47; see also United States v. Turner, 475 F. Supp. 194, 201 (E.D. Mich. 1978)
("trustworthiness is not determined by merely looking at corroborating facts, but also and
more importantly, by looking at the circumstances in which the declarant made the
statement").
59 See 4 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 36, 804(b)(3)[03], at 804-108.
60 United States v. Bailey, 581 F.2d 341, 349 (3d Cir. 1978):
Since the rule [804(b)(5)] is designed to come into play when there is a need for the
evidence in order to ascertain the truth in a case, it would make little sense for ajudge, in
determining whether the hearsay is admissible, to examine only facts corroborating the
substance of the declaration. Such an analysis in effect might increase the likelihood of
admissibility when corroborating circumstances indicate a reduced need for the intro-
duction of the hearsay statement.
For example, heavily corroborated grand jury testimony may no longer be "more proba-
tive on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can
procure through reasonable efforts" and thus would fail to meet the admissibility require-
ments of Rule 804(b)(5). See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(5), supra note 9.
61 United States v. Barlow, 693 F.2d 954, 962 (6th Cir. 1982); United States v. Thevis, 665
F.2d 616, 628-29 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2300 (1982); United States v. Bailey, 581
F.2d 341, 346 (3d Cir. 1978); United States v. Garner, 574 F.2d 1141, 1144 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 936 (1978); United States v. West, 574 F.2d 1131, 1135 (4th Cir. 1978);
United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1354 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977);
United States v. Turner, 475 F. Supp. 194, 200 (E.D. Mich. 1978). Such an interpretation is
in accord with the language of Rule 804(b)(5) which allows the admission of "[a] statement
not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstan-
tial guarantees of trustworthiness .... " FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(5).
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804(b) hearsay exceptions include an exception for former testimony, 62
statements under belief of impending death,63 statements against one's
own interest,64 and statements of personal or family history.65 Each
statement is admissible as a hearsay exception because each is made
under conditions that guarantee the truthfulness of the statement. 66 For-
mer testimony is admissible because counsel has previously cross-ex-
amined the declarant to test the accuracy of the testimony.
67
Statements under belief of impending death are admissible because of
the assumption that a person cognizant of impending death would not
lie.68 Statements against interest are admissible because courts assume
that a person would not speak falsely against himself.69 Statements of
personal or family history are admissible because courts assume that
persons do not generally lie about statements concerning "ordinary af-
fairs of life."'7
0
The procedural and corroborative tests would ensure that grand
62 FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1).
63 FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2).
64 FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).
65 FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(4).
66 See Bailq, 581 F.2d at 348. The rationale behind the Rule 804(b) hearsay exceptions is
that "hearsay which admittedly is not equal in quality to testimony of the declarant on the
stand may nevertheless be admitted if the declarant is unavailable and if his statement meets
a specified standard." Advisory Committee's Notes, supra note 22, at 323.
67 See Advisory Committee's Notes, supra note 22, at 323 (notes to Rule 804(b)(1)): "For-
mer testimony does not rely upon some set of circumstances to substitute for oath and cross-
examination, since both oath and opportunity to cross-examine were present in fact." Rule
804(b)(1) limits the former testimony admissible at trial to instances where "the party against
whom the testimony is now offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor in inter-
est, had an opportunity and a similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or
redirect examination." FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(1).
68 See Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 152 (1892). Wigmore states that "[a]ll
courts have agreed, with more or less difference of language, that the approach of death pro-
duces a state of mind in which the utterances of the dying person are to be taken as free from
all ordinary motives to misstate." 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note I, at § 1438 (emphasis in origi-
nal);see Advisory Committee's Notes, supra note 22, at 326 (notes to proposed Rule 804(b) (3),
enacted as Rule 804(b) (2)): "While the original religious justification for the exception may
have lost its conviction for some persons over the years, it can scarcely be doubted that power-
ful psychological pressures are present"; see also 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, at § 1443 ("nat-
ural and instinctive awe at the approach of an unknown future" is the essential circumstantial
guarantee of reliability of dying declarations).
69 See Advisory Committee's Notes, supra note 22, at 327 (notes to proposed Rule
804(b) (4), enacted as Rule 804(b)(3)): "The circumstantial guaranty of reliability for declara-
tions against interest is the assumption that persons do not make statements which are dam-
aging to themselves unless satisfied for good reason that they are true"; see also 5 J. WIGMORE,
supra note 1, at § 1457.
70 See 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, at § 1482; Advisory Committee's Notes, supra note 22,
at 328 (notes to proposed Rule 804(b) (5), enacted as Rule 804(b)(4)). Judge Weinstein notes
that Rule 804(b)(4) "rests on the assumption that the type of declarant specified by the rule
[the declarant must be related or intimately associated with the family] will not make a state-
ment about the type of fact covered by the rule [examples include date of birth, adoption,
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jury testimony admitted under 804(b) (5) contains guarantees of trust-
worthiness similar to or exceeding the guarantees of the other 804(b)
hearsay exceptions. Unlike a hearsay declarant making a statement
under belief of impending death, a statement against interest, or a state-
ment of personal or family history, a grand jury witness always testifies
in a formal judicial setting, under oath, and subject to penalties for per-
jury.7t The procedural test would ensure that all grand jury testimony
admitted under 804(b) (5) conforms with trial evidentiary standards.
Only the 804(b) hearsay exception for former testimony admits state-
ments necessarily taken in conformity with the rules of evidence. 72 Fur-
thermore, the corroborative test would ensure that independent
evidence supports the truth of all grand jury testimony admitted under
804(b) (5). No other 804(b) hearsay exception requires independent cor-
roboration except when a statement exposing the declarant to criminal
liability is offered to exculpate the accused.73 Thus, the use of the proce-
dural and corroborative tests would ensure that grand jury testimony
contains sufficient guarantees of reliability to admit as substantive evi-
dence at trial under Rule 804(b)(5).
74
IV. THE ADVANTAGES OF THE Two TESTS
Three principal advantages exist when federal judges use the proce-
marriage, divorce, and ancestry] unless it is trustworthy." 4 WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE, supra
note 36, 804(b) (4) [01], at 804-117; see FED. R. EVID. 804(b) (4).
71 See FRANKEL, THE GRAND JURY, supra note 17, at 20, 102; FED. R. EVID. 804(b) (2),
804(b) (3), &.804(b) (4).
72 See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1).
73 See FED. R. EvID. 804(b) (3); see also supra note 53.
74 The hearsay rule ensures that witnesses testify under three ideal conditions: (1) under
oath; (2) in the personal presence of the trier of fact; and (3) subject to cross-examination. See
supra note 2; Advisory Committee's Notes, supra note 22, at 288. No one advocates the exclu-
sion of all testimony that does not comply with the three ideal conditions.
Common sense tells that much evidence which is not given under the three conditions
may be inherently superior to much that is. Moreover, when the choice is between evi-
dence which is less than best and no evidence at all, only clear folly would dictate an
across-the-board policy of doing without.
Advisory Committee's Notes, supra note 22, at 289.
Under no hearsay exception has the declarant testified in the personal presence of the
trier of fact, and thus met McCormick's second condition. Id at 323. Because grand jury
witnesses always testify under oath, an unavailable witness's grand jury testimony fails to
satisfy only one of the ideal conditions that other hearsay exceptions may satisfy: the test of
cross-examination.
Where a party cannot cross-examine the witness (such as in a Rule 804(b)(5) situation
where the witness is unavailable), "it is clear at least that, so far as in a given instance some
substitute for cross-examination is found to have been present, there is ground for making an
exception." 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, at § 1420 (emphasis in original). This Comment
posits that the procedural and corroborative tests provide an adequate substitute for cross-
examination by ensuring that the grand jury testimony offered under 804(b)(5) is "free
enough from the risk of inaccuracy and untrustworthiness." Id
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dural and corroborative tests to determine whether grand jury testi-
mony contains "equivalent circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness." First, the two tests would resolve the disagreement in
the federal courts about what circumstances are necessary to admit
grand jury testimony at trial under 804(b) (5) without violating the Con-
frontation Clause of the sixth amendment. Second, the two tests would
be easy to implement. Third, the two tests are consistent with the legis-
lative history of Rule 804(b)(5).
A. RESOLVING THE 804(b) (5) AND CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
DISAGREEMENT IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
. Admitting GrandJug Testimony Under 804(b)(5)
The federal courts have taken one of two approaches when decid-
ing whether to admit grand jury testimony into evidence under
804(b)(5). Several federal courts have excluded the grand jury testi-
mony because grand jury procedures make the testimony unreliable.
75
Other federal courts have admitted the grand jury testimony when suffi-
cient corroborative evidence exists to support the truth of the testi-
mony. 76 Using the procedural and corroborative tests, federal courts
could combine both approaches in their 804(b)(5) analyses.
The two tests would allow federal courts to determine clearly when
to admit grand jury testimony at trial under Rule 804(b)(5). Under the
procedural test, courts must exclude grand jury testimony elicited in vio-
lation of trial evidentiary rules. Under the corroborative test, courts
must also exclude grand jury testimony that conforms with trial eviden-
tiary rules but is uncorroborated by independent evidence. Courts may
admit grand jury testimony elicited in conformity with trial evidentiary
rules when independent evidence exists to support the truth of the testi-
mony. Thus, the procedural and corroborative tests would enable fed-
eral courts to take into account both the unreliable nature of grand jury
testimony and the necessity of admitting crucial corroborated grand
jury testimony at trial.
2. Admitting GrandJug Testimony Under the Confrontation Clause
The procedural and corroborative tests also would ensure that any
grand jury testimony admitted at trial under 804(b)(5) meets the
Supreme Court's Confrontation Clause standards. The Confrontation
Clause of the sixth amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right. . . to be confronted with the witnesses
75 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
76 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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against him." 7 7 The primary purpose of the Confrontation Clause is to
prevent trials by deposition and exparte affidavits.78 Although little leg-
islative history exists to explain the Confrontation Clause,79 the
Supreme Court has held that confrontation primarily guarantees de-
fendants the right to cross-examine their accusers and, secondarily, it
provides the jury with the opportunity to observe the demeanor of wit-
nesses at trial to determine whether the witnesses are telling the truth.80
Consequently, the admission of grand jury testimony under
804(b)(5) may violate the defendant's confrontation right because the
witness is not present at trial for defense counsel to cross-examine and
77 U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
78 Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242 (1895).
79 The brief congressional debate on the Confrontation Clause is recorded in I ANNALS OF
CONG. 452, 784-85, 948 (J. Gales ed. 1789).
The Confrontation Clause may have originated in the abuses in the trial of Sir Walter
Raleigh. See Park v. Huff, 506 F.2d 849, 861-62 (5th Cir. 1975) (Gewin, J., concurring);
United States v. Payne, 492 F.2d 449, 458 (4th Cir.) (Widener, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 876 (1974); F. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTrruTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 104-06 (1969). But see Graham, The Right of Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule:
Sir Walter Raleigh Loses Another One, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 99, 100 n.4, 104 n.23 (1972) (the theory
that the Confrontation Clause originated in the evils of Raleigh's trial is a "highly romantic
myth"); Pollitt, The Right of Confrontation: Its Histog and Modern Dress, 8 J. PUB. L. 381, 395-97
(1959) (Confrontation Clause originated in the abuses allowed in admiralty courts).
80 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968);
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965); Mattox, 156 U.S. at 242-43; see also 5 J. WIGMORE,
supra note 1, at § 1365.
Because of the paucity of legislative history on the Confrontation Clause, commentators
have proposed many theories to guide the Court's Confrontation Clause analysis. Wigmore,
for example; argued that the Confrontation Clause constitutionalizes the hearsay rule with its
past, present, and future hearsay exceptions. 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, at § 1397; see also
Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 94-97 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (Confrontation Clause
regulates trial procedure through the rules of evidence); Graham, The Confrontation Clause, the
Hearsay Rule, and the Forgetful Witness, 56 TEx. L. REv. 151 (1978) (author adopts Wigmore's
approach but applies the Confrontation Clause only to accusatory statements); Note, The
Confiontation Testfor Hearsay Exceptions." An Uncertain Standard California v. Green, 59 CALIF. L.
REV. 580 (1971) (Confrontation Clause is congruent with the hearsay rules of evidence).
Another theory suggests that the Confrontation Clause applies only to available, not
unavailable, witnesses. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 173-92 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring); Baker, The Right to Confrontation, The Hearsay Rules, and Due Process-A Proposalfor
Determining When Hearsay May Be Used in Criminal Trials, 6 CONN. L. REV. 529 (1974); Westen,
The Future of Confrontation, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1185 (1979); Younger, Confrontation andHearsay: A
Look Backward, A Peek Forward, I HOFSTRA L. REv. 32 (1973).
Another commentator suggests that the right of confrontation is a constitutional bar to
hearsay evidence irrespective of any hearsay exceptions unless (1) no alternative means exist
to obtain the same evidence without denying the accused the opportunity for confrontation,
(2) the evidence possesses a high degree of trustworthiness, and (3) the evidence was created
without motive to falsify or affect criminal proceedings. Seidelson, Hearsay Exceptions and the
Sixth Amendment, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 76, 92 (1971); cf. Graham, supra note 79, at 107 (the
use of the witness's statements determines when a person is a "witness against" the accused).
The Supreme Court has refused to adopt any of the proposed theories because none
satisfactorily resolves all confrontation problems. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 68 n.9 (1980).
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for the jury to observe the witness's demeanor.8 1 The Supreme Court
has recognized, however, that the right of confrontation is not an abso-
lute right.8 2 For example, the Court has found no Confrontation Clause
bar to the admission at trial of dying declarations83 and unavailable
witnesses' former trial8 4 and preliminary hearing8 5 testimony.
In the Supreme Court's most recent Confrontation Clause decision,
Ohio v. Roberts,8 6 the Court adopted a two-part test to determine when a
court may admit an unavailable witness's out-of-court statement with-
out violating the Confrontation Clause. First, the prosecution must
show that it made a good-faith effort to secure the witness's presence at
trial.8 7 Second, the statement must contain sufficient "indicia of relia-
bility" to provide the jury with an adequate basis upon which to evalu-
ate the truth of the statement.8 8 Courts can automatically presume that
81 See FED. R. EvID. 804(b).
82 Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 407 (1965). In Pointer, the Court applied the Confronta-
tion Clause to the states through the fourteenth amendment. The Court held that uncross-
examined preliminary hearing testimony admitted at trial as substantive evidence violated
the defendant's right to confrontation. Id at 407. Because the Court held that confrontation
included the right of cross-examination, many commentators feared that the Supreme Court
had constitutionalized the hearsay rule in the sixth amendment. See, e.g., Advisory Commit-
tee's Notes, supra note 22, at 291; Note, Confiontation and the Hearsay Rule, 75 YALE L.J. 1434
(1966). If the right of confrontation was absolute, the Confrontation Clause would "abrogate
virtually every hearsay exception" because statements admitted under most hearsay excep-
tions lack cross-examination. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980); United States v.
Balano, 618 F.2d 624, 627 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 840 (1980); see the federal
exceptions to the hearsay rule in FED. R. EVID. 803 & 804. The Court, however, has refused
to equate the Confrontation Clause with the hearsay rule. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86
(1970); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970).
83 Pointer, 380 U.S. at 407; Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243-44 (1895).
84 Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
85 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
86 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
87 Id. at 65. The Supreme Court first required that prosecutors demonstrate the unavaila-
bility of a witness in Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968). The Court held that the admission
at trial of a witness's preliminary hearing testimony violated the defendant's confrontation
right because the prosecutor had not made a good-faith effort to obtain the witness's presence
at trial. Id. at 724-25. In two subsequent cases, the Court noted that the prosecutor had
made a good-faith effort to secure the witness for trial. See Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204,
212 (1972); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 167 (1970). In Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74
(1970), however, the-Court admitted hearsay evidence without requiring the prosecutor to
demonstrate the unavailability of the witness.
88 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65-66. The Supreme Court first mentioned the "indicia of reliabil-
ity" test in Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970). In Dutton, the defendant objected to the
admission at trial of a statement made by one prisoner who had overheard another prisoner
implicate the defendant in a murder. Id. at 77. The Court refused to find a Confrontation
Clause violation because the statement contained sufficient "indicia of reliability" to afford
the trier of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the statement. Id. at 88. The
statement contained no factual assertions which, on its face, warned the jury against over-
weighing it; the prisoner who implicated the defendant had personal knowledge of the iden-
tity and role of the persons involved in the murder; only a remote chance existed that the
prisoner's recollection was faulty; one prisoner made the incriminating statement to another
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the statement contains sufficient "indicia of reliability" if the statement
falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.8 9 If the statement does
not fall within a recognized hearsay exception, the statement must con-
tain "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" before a court can
admit the statement without violating the defendant's right of
confrontation. 9°
The witness unavailability requirements of Rule 80491 satisfy the
first part of the Supreme Court's confrontation test. Before a court may
admit grand jury testimony at trial under 804(b) (5), 804(a) (5) requires
that the prosecutor use "process or other reasonable means" to procure
the witness's presence at trial.9 2 The Supreme Court has held that the
prosecutor's use of "reasonable means" to procure the witness's presence
prisoner, which suggested that the statement did not misrepresent the defendant's role in the
crime; and the statement was spontaneous and against the declarant's penal interest. Id. at
88-89. In a subsequent case, Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 216 (1972), the Court held that
previously cross-examined trial testimony admitted at a retrial for the same offense also con-
tained adequate "indicia of reliability."
89 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
90 Id. The Supreme Court's confrontation standard was uncertain before the Court
promulgated the two-part test in Roberts. Compare Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1975) (pre-
liminary hearing testimony inadmissible because it was not cross-examined) with Dutton v.
Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970) (uncross-examined statement admissible because it contained suffi-
cient "indicia of reliability"); compare also Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968) (prosecutor has
to make a good-faith effort to obtain witness's presence at trial) with Dutton v. Evans, 400
U.S. 74 (1970) (Court did not require a good-faith showing of the unavailability of the wit-
ness).
In United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1357 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914
(1977), the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to decide whether grand jury testimony
admitted under 804(b)(5) would violate the Confrontation Clause because the Supreme
Court had not yet set a clear confrontation standard. The Supreme Court currently views the
Confrontation Clause as restricting the range of admissible hearsay by the two-part test. Rob-
erts, 448 U.S. at 65. For a brief summary of the Supreme Court's Confrontation Clause deci-
sions before 1970, see Advisory Committee's Notes, szpra note 22, at 291-92.
91 FED. R. EVID. 804(a). Courts may admit hearsay evidence under the Rule 804(b) hear-
say exceptions only if the declarant is unavailable for trial. FED. R. EvID. 804(b). Rule 804(a)
defines unavailability:
"Unavailability as a witness" includes situations in which the declarant:
(1) Is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from testifying concern-
ing the subject matter of his statement; or
(2) Persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of his statement despite
order of the court to do so; or
(3) Testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of his statement; or
(4) Is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or then existing
physical or mental illness or infirmity; or
(5) Is absent from the hearing and the proponent of his statement has been unable to
procure his attendance (or in the case of a hearsay exception under subdivision (b)(2),
(3), or (4), his attendance or testimony) by process or other reasonable means.
A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if his exemption, refusal, claim of lack of
memory, inability, or absence is due to the procurement or wrongdoing of the proponent
of his statement for the purpose of preventing the witness from attending or testifying.
92 FED. R. EvID. 804(a)(5).
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at trial satisfies the good-faith confrontation standard. 93
The procedural and corroborative tests would satisfy the second
part of the Supreme Court's confrontation test by ensuring that grand
jury testimony admitted under 804(b)(5) contains "particularized guar-
antees of trustworthiness. '94 The procedural test would ensure that the
grand jury witness has testified in a formal judicial setting, under oath,
subject to penalties for perjury, and in conformance with trial eviden-
tiary rules.9 5 These are the same conditions under which an accuser
would testify against a defendant at trial.
Moreover, the procedural and corroborative tests would ensure that
grand jury testimony admitted under 804(b) (5) contains "particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness" similar to or exceeding the guarantees of
the Supreme Court's recognized exceptions to the Confrontation Clause:
dying declarations96 and an unavailable witness's former trial9 7 and pre-
liminary hearing98 testimony. Dying declarations contain none of the
guarantees of reliability present when courts use the procedural and cor-
roborative tests to admit grand jury testimony as substantive evidence at
93 See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 74 ("The lengths to which the prosecution must go to produce a
witness. . . is a question of reasonableness.") (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 189
n.22 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
The Court has required that the prosecutor make only a minimal effort to obtain the
witness's presence at trial. For example, in Roberts, the prosecutor's sole effort to locate the
witness was to issue five subpoenas to the witness's parents' home, three of which were issued
after the prosecutor learned that the witness no longer lived with her parents. 448 U.S. at 79
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Although possible leads to the witness's whereabouts existed, id. at
81, the Court held that the prosecution had not breached its duty to make a good-faith effort.
Id. at 75.
Similarly, in Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 209 (1972), the State sent one subpoena to
the witness's former residence and then relied wholly upon the witness's son's testimony that
the witness had moved to Sweden. Although the State made no other effort to secure the
witness's presence, id. at 220 (Marshall, J., dissenting), the Court held that the State had
adequately established the unavailability of the witness. Id. at 212.
The Court distinguished the situations in Roberts and Aancusi from Barber v. Page, 390
U.S. 719 (1968). See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 76-77; Mancuei, 408 U.S. at 210-12. In Barber, the
prosecutor knew the exact location of the witness (in an adjacent state's federal penitentiary),
standard procedures existed to allow the prosecutor to bring the witness to trial (the federal
writ of habeas corpus ad testifrandum, see 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(5) (1976), and the established
practice of the United States Bureau of Prisons to honor state writs of habeas corpus ad testifi-
candum), and the witness was not in a position to frustrate prosecutorial efforts to secure the
witness's presence at trial (the witness was incarcerated). Barber, 390 U.S. at 723-24.
94 Courts cannot merely infer that grand jury testimony admitted under 804(b) (5) is relia-
ble under the Supreme Court's confrontation test because Rule 804(b)(5) is not a "firmly
rooted hearsay exception." United States v. Barlow, 693 F.2d 954, 964 (6th Cir. 1982) (quot-
ing Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66).
95 See supra text accompanying notes 71-72.
96 Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 407 (1965); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243-
44 (1895).
97 Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
98 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
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trial.99 Although former trial or preliminary hearing testimony contains
the same procedural reliability guarantees as grand jury testimony ad-
mitted under 804(b) (5), the trial or preliminary hearing testimony is not
necessarily corroborated by independent evidence.10 0 Because use of the
procedural and corroborative tests would ensure that the grand jury tes-
timony meets both the "equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trust-
worthiness" requirement of 804(b)(5) and the "particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness" standard of the Confrontation Clause,
federal courts would not have to make a separate Confrontation Clause
determination when admitting an unavailable witness's grand jury testi-
mony under 804(b)(5).
Furthermore, the use of the procedural and corroborative tests
would serve two additional purposes of confrontation: first, to impress
upon the witness the seriousness of the matter and to guard against the
99 See supra text accompanying notes 71-74. The Supreme Court has noted that dying
declarations are reliable because "certain expectation of almost immediate death will remove
all temptation to falsehood." Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 152 (1892). Many com-
mentators have challenged the reliability of dying declarations, however. The desire for re-
venge, self-exoneration, or to protect loved ones may continue until the moment of death.
The declarant's physical or mental state at the time of impending death may impair the
declarant's faculties ofperception, memory, or communication. Moreover, the declarant may
have made the statement in response to the prompting and questioning of interested bystand-
ers such as policemen, insurance agents, or investigators. See 4 WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE, supra
note 36, 804(b)(2)[01] at 804-81; Quick, Some Reftections on Dying Declarations, 6 How. L.J.
109, 111-12 (1960); Note, Dying Declarations, 46 IOWA L. REv. 375, 376 (1961).
McCormick characterizes dying declarations as the hearsay exception "most mystical in
its theory and traditionally the most arbitrary in its limitations." C. McCORMICK, supra note
1, at § 281. The House Committee on the Judiciary "did not consider dying declarations as
among the most reliable forms of hearsay." H.R. REP. No. 650, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 15,
repinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEwS 7075, 7089.
100 See supra text accompanying notes 71-74. Defense counsel, however, may have cross-
examined a former trial witness or preliminary hearing witness. Although Wigmore charac-
terized cross-examination as "the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of
truth," 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, at § 1367, cross-examination contains error-producing
hazards.
It is, in truth, quite doubtful whether it is not the honest but weak or timid witness,
rather than the rogue, who most often goes down under the fire of cross-examina-
tion. . . . Cross-examination, it is submitted, should be considered as useful but not
indispensable as an agency of discovering truth, and absence of opportunity to cross-
examine should only be one factor to be weighed in determining whether the statement
or testimony should be received.
C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at § 31.
The Supreme Court noted in United States v. Wade that "even though cross-examination is
a precious safeguard to a fair trial, it cannot be viewed as an absolute assurance of accuracy
and reliability." 388 U.S. 218, 235 (1967); see also United States v. Balano, 618 F.2d 624, 628
(10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 840 (1980)(" 'The Supreme Court has never intimated
[,however,] that cross-examination is the only means by which prior recorded testimony may
be qualified for admission under the Confrontation Clause.' " (quoting United States v. West,
574 F.2d 1131, 1137 (4th Cir. 1978))).
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lie,' 0 ' and second, to maintain the "accuracy of the truth-determining
process."10 2 The procedural test and the inherent guarantees of reliabil-
ity of grand jury testimony 0 3 would satisfy the first purpose by requir-
ing that grand jury witnesses testify under oath, in a formal judicial
setting, subject to penalties for perjury, and in conformance with trial
evidentiary rules. The corroborative test would satisfy the second pur-
pose by requiring that independent evidence exist to support the truth
of the grand jury testimony. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has
held that sufficient corroboration alone provides grand jury testimony
with adequate "indicia of reliability" to satisfy the Confrontation
Clause. 1 4
Irrespective of the use of the procedural and corroborative tests, the
requirements of 804(b) (5) should satisfy the Supreme Court's confronta-
tion test for two additional reasons. First, although the drafters of the
Federal Rules of Evidence explicitly avoided codifying constitutional
principles, 10 5 the 804(b)(5) requirements and the Supreme Court's
confrontation test are strikingly similar. Both 804(b)(5) and the con-
frontation test require prosecutors to make a reasonable effort to secure
the witnesses' presence at trial.10 6 Both 804(b) (5) and the confrontation
test also contain similar standards of reliability. While the confronta-
tion test requires that the statement contain "particularized guarantees
of trustworthiness," 10 7 804(b)(5) requires that the statement contain
"equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness."'' 08 If strictly
followed, the 804(b)(5) requirements may even be more stringent than
the Supreme Court's confrontation test because 804(b)(5) also requires
that the statement be evidence of a material fact, that the statement be
101 The Confrontation Clause ensures reliability by requiring "that the witness will give his
statements under oath-thus impressing him with the seriousness of the matter and guarding
against the lie by the possibility of a penalty for perjury." Roberts, 448 U.S. at 64 n.6 (quoting
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970)).
102 Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970).
103 See supra text accompanying notes 21-23.
104 See United States v. Garner, 574 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 936 (1978);
United States v. West, 574 F.2d 1131 (4th Cir. 1978); see also United States v. Mastrangelo,
533 F. Supp. 380, 391 (E.D.N.Y.), remanded on other grounds, 693 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1982) (cor-
roborated grand jury testimony passes the Supreme Court's two-part confrontation test).
105 S. REP. No. 1277, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 22, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 7051, 7068; Advisory Committee's Notes, supra note 22, at 292. The Senate report
noted that "the basic approach of the rules is to avoid codifying, or attempting to codify,
constitutional evidentiary principles, such as the fifth amendment's right against self-incrimi-
nation and, here, the sixth amendment's right of confrontation. Codification of a constitu-
tional principle is unnecessary and, where the principle is under development, often unwise."
S. REP. No. 1277 at 22, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 7068.
106 See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
107 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
108 FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(5).
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more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evi-
dence readily obtainable, that the purposes of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence and the interests of justice be served by the admission of the
statement, and that the proponent of the statement give the adverse
party timely notice of the proponent's intention to admit the statement
under 804(b) (5).109
Second, as the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has noted, the
804(b)(5) requirements satisfy the Supreme Court's confrontation test
by definition.1 10 A court may not admit evidence under 804(b) (5) unless
the evidence contains "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness"
equivalent to the trustworthiness of other 804(b) hearsay exceptions."'
The Supreme Court has stated that two 804(b) hearsay exceptions, for-
mer testimony (804(b)(1)) and dying declarations (804(b)(2)), are also
exceptions to the Confrontation Clause."12 Because evidence admitted
under 804(b)(5) must contain guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent
to the trustworthiness of dying declarations and former testimony, and
dying declarations and former testimony contain sufficient "indicia of
reliability" to pass Confrontation Clause standards, evidence admitted
under 804(b)(5) should automatically satisfy Confrontation Clause
standards.
B. IMPLEMENTING THE PROCEDURAL AND CORROBORATIVE TESTS
The procedural and corroborative tests would be easy for federal
judges to implement. Pursuant to Rule 104,'' 3 United States District
109 Id. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has acknowledged that "many of the 'particu-
larized guarantees of truthworthiness' required by Roberts are ensured by the threshold [Rule
804(b)(5)] evidentiary question." United States v. A arlow, 693 F.2d 954, 965 n.10 (6th Cir.
1982). Furthermore, "there are occasions, such as in the instant case, in which the rules of
evidence provide more than enough protection for the defendant and no confrontation issue
is actually present." Id. In Barlow, the defendant was charged with stealing fur garments.
The defendant claimed that he was with his girlfriend at the time of the theft. The defend-
ant's girlfriend testified before the grand jury that she had not seen the defendant for approxi-
mately three and one-half hours during the night of the theft. The government introduced
the girlfriend's grand jury testimony at trial under Rule 804(b)(5). The girlfriend was un-
available at the trial because she had married the defendant in the interim and had exercised
her marital privilege not to testify. Id. at 956-57. The court held that the circumstances
surrounding the grand jury testimony satisfied both the Rule 804(b) (5) and the Confronta-
tion Clause requirements. Id. at 963, 965. The court noted that the girlfriend had no motive
to implicate the defendant, she testified from personal knowledge, and other testimonial and
physical evidence allowed the trier of fact to infer that the defendant had participated in the
fur theft. Id. at 962.
110 United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 628-29 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2300
(1982).
111 FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(5).
112 See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
113 See FED. R. EVID. 104(a) and 104(c); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(3) and 57(b). The
Advisory Committee's Notes to Rule 104(a) state that the trial judge is to determine the
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Court judges routinely hold evidentiary hearings before trial to decide
whether to admit evidence under Rule 804(b)(5).114 Because Rule
804(b) (5) requires the proponent of the hearsay evidence to give the ad-
verse party timely notice of the proponent's intention to offer the evi-
dence under Rule 804(b)(5), 1 5 the trial judge has the opportunity to
apply the procedural and corroborative tests to the grand jury testimony
at the pre-trial evidentiary hearing.'
16
To implement the procedural test, the trial judge may treat the
grand jury transcript as a deposition and strike the portions of the testi-
mony elicited through violations of trial evidentiary rules., 17 The judge
may wish to permit the adverse party to examine the grand jury tran-
script and insert appropriate evidentiary objections. The trial judge
then may rule on the objections at the evidentiary hearing.118
The trial judge must also determine whether independent evidence
adequately corroborates the grand jury testimony. The proponent of
the grand jury testimony should present the corroborative evidence
before the trial judge at the evidentiary hearing.'1 9 The sufficiency of
the corroboration is a matter best left solely to the discretion of the trial
judge because the corroborative evidence will vary from case to case.120
admissibility of evidence. Advisory Committee's Notes, supra note 22, at 197; see United
States v. Walker, 696 F.2d 277, 281 (4th Cir. 1982) ("The technical requirements of Rule
804(b)(5) and the Confrontation Clause are concerns of the judge and not the jury."); C.
MCCORMICK, sufira note 1, at § 53; 1 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 36, 1 104[06], at
104-45 ("The trial judge has primary responsibility under Rule 104(a) for determining those
circumstances which offer adequate assurance of accuracy and which therefore justify admis-
sion of evidence.").
114 See United States v. Balano, 618 F.2d 624, 626 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 840
(1980); United States v. West, 574 F.2d 1131, 1134 (4th Cir. 1978); United States v. Carlson,
547 F.2d 1346, 1353 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977); United States v. Mas-
trangelo, 533 F. Supp. 389 (E.D.N.Y.), remanded on other grounds , 693 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1982);
United States v. Turner, 475 F. Supp. 194, 196 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
115 See supra note 9.
116 4 WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE, supra note 36, 1 803(1)[01], at 803-68: "The pretrial confer-
ence affords an excellent opportunity for bringing the matter [the admissibility of evidence] to
the Court's attention, permitting it to require briefs where needed and to rule on the issue
before trial."
117 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(e):
At the trial or upon any hearing, a part or all of a deposition, so far as otherwise admissi-
ble under the rules of evidence, may be used as substantive evidence if the witness is
unavailable, as unavailability is defined in Rule 804(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
or the witness gives testimony at the trial or hearing inconsistent with his deposition.
118 See, e.g., United States v. Murphy, 696 F.2d 282, 285 (4th Cir. 1982), where the govern-
ment supplied defense counsel with a copy of the grand jury testimony and counsel discussed
the admissibility problems with the trial judge before the trial.
119 See 4 WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE, supra note 36, 1 804(b)(3)[03], at 804-104.
120 7 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, at §§ 2059, 2062; see supra text accompanying notes 41-46.
In United States v. Barlow, 693 F.2d 954, 962 (6th Cir. 1982), the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals suggested that the degree of corroboration should vary depending upon the purpose
for which the grand jury testimony is offered. Corroboration need not be great when the
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Thus, the pre-trial evidentiary hearing allows the trial judge to im-
plement both the procedural and corroborative tests and rule on the
admissibility of the grand jury testimony under 804(b) (5) without dis-
rupting or delaying the criminal trial.
C. THE TWO TESTS AND THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF RULE
804(b) (5)
The procedural and corroborative tests are consistent with the legis-
lative intent of Rule 804(b)(5) and the spirit of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. 12' The drafters of the federal rules intended for courts to use
Rule 804(b)(5) rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances.' 22 Fur-
thermore, the drafters did not intend to give trial judges unfettered dis-
cretion to create new categories of hearsay exceptions such as a new
exception for grand jury testimony.'
23
testimony is offered for a limited purpose such as refuting a defendant's alibi. Courts should
require a high degree of corroboration, however, when the grand jury testimony is offered as
direct evidence of criminal activity. Id.
Nevertheless, a too strict corroboration standard would destroy the utility of admitting
grand jury testimony under Rule 804(b)(5). See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
Perhaps "[t]he court should only ask for sufficient corroboration to 'clearly' permit a reason-
able man to believe that the statement might have been made in good faith and that it could
be true." 4 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 36, 804(b)(3)[03], at 804-104.
121 Rule 804(b)(5) originated in the Supreme Court's proposed draft of the Federal Rules
of Evidence. Advisory Committee's Notes, supra note 22. The Supreme Court favored a
broad residual hearsay exception to promote the "growth and development of the law of
evidence in the hearsay area." Id. at 320.
The United States House of Representatives deleted the proposed residual hearsay ex-
ception because such a broad exception would inject too much uncertainty into the law of
evidence, thereby hindering an attorney's ability to prepare for trial. H.R. REP. No. 650,
93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 6, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7075, 7079.
The Senate reinstated the residual hearsay exception. Without a residual hearsay excep-
tion, the Senate feared that courts, in order to admit reliable hearsay into trial, would stretch
existing hearsay exceptions beyond their intended scope. S. REP. No. 1277, 93rd Cong., 2d
Sess. 19, repinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7051, 7065. In addition, the Senate
wanted to provide for the admission into evidence of reliable non-excepted hearsay in excep-
tional cases. Id.
The Conference Committee adopted the Senate's version of the residual hearsay excep-
tion but added a notice requirement. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1597, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 13,
repn'ntedin 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7098, 7106. For a compilation of the legisla-
tive history of the Federal Rules of Evidence, see ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY: PRACTICE
UNDER THE NEW FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE (1975); WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note
22, vols. 1-5.
122 S. REP. No. 1277 at 20, repn'nedin 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7051, 7066.
For an example of a case in which the residual hearsay exception would apply, see S. REP.
No. 1277 at 19, reprinted h7 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 7065-66 (citing Dallas
County v. Commercial Union Ass'n, Co., Ltd., 286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1961) (fifty-six-year-old
newspaper article admitted under general principles of trustworthiness as substantive evi-
dence of a previous fire in a courthouse)).
123 S. REP. No. 1277 at 20, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7051, 7066:
"The committee does not intend to establish a broad license for trial judges to admit hearsay
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Because grand jury testimony is neither rare nor exceptional, a24 ad-
mitting all grand jury testimony at trial would be a major judicial revi-
sion of the hearsay rule.125 The drafters of 804(b) (5), however, intended
that only Congress would have the power to substantially revise the fed-
eral rules.' 26 Thus, the drafters intended for courts to use a case-by-case
approach when admitting hearsay under 804(b) (5).127
The procedural and corroborative tests would be consistent with
the drafters' restrictive case-by-case approach to Rule 804(b)(5). The
tests would permit courts to admit grand jury testimony at trial under
804(b) (5) only when the testimony conforms with trial evidentiary rules
and independent evidence adequately corroborates the testimony. The
trial judge would have to decide whether the grand jury testimony
passes both the procedural and corroborative tests based upon the cir-
cumstances of each case. Depending upon prosecutors' willingness to
conform to trial evidentiary rules in grand jury proceedings and upon
trial judges' standards of corroboration, grand jury testimony may sat-
isfy both tests only in rare and exceptional cases.
Finally, the procedural and corroborative tests are consistent with
the spirit of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The purpose of the federal
rules is to promote the growth and development of the law of evidence
so as to ascertain the truth and justly determine proceedings.' 28 Al-
though grand jury testimony is hearsay, the drafters' flexible approach
statements that do not fall within one of the other exceptions contained in rules 803 and
804(b)." The Advisory Committee's Notes to the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence state
that the residual hearsay exceptions "do not contemplate an unfettered exercise of judicial
discretion, but they do provide for new and presently unanticipated situations which demon-
strate a trustworthiness within the spirit of the specifically stated exceptions." Advisory Com-
mittee's Notes, supra note 22, at 320; see aso 4 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 36,
804(b) (5)[0 1], at 804-126 ("Rule 804(b) (5) should not become an automatic formula for intro-
ducing uncross-examined grand jury statements or other statements of dubious reliability
which do not meet the requirements of other hearsay exceptions.").
124 United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 629 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2300 (1982).
In the federal judicial system, no person may be brought to trial for a felony unless first
indicted by a grand jury: "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or
public danger. . . ." U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
The use of grand juries is less prevalent in the states, however. Twenty-two states require
grand jury indictments in felony cases, three states require grand jury indictments only when
the crime is punishable by death or life imprisonment, and 25 states give the prosecutor the
choice whether to seek a grand jury indictment or file an information charging the defendant
with the crime. FRANKEL, THE GRAND JURY, supra note 17, at 3, 16 (1977 data). Prosecutors
seldom seek grand jury indictments in those states that give the prosecutor a choice. Id.
125 Thevis, 665 F.2d at 629.
126 Id.; S. REP. No. 1277 at 20, repinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7051, 7066.
127 See 1 WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE, supra note 36, 102[01], at 102-9.
128 FFD. R. EVID. 102: "These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in administration,
elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth and development of
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to the rules of evidence encourages courts to admit reliable hearsay at
trial if it is the best evidence available. 29 The procedural and corrobo-
rative tests would ensure that courts admit only reliable grand jury testi-
mony under 804(b)(5). Thus, the two tests would further the
ascertainment of truth by providing the jury with additional reliable
evidence to better enable them to arrive at a "just" verdict.
V. CONCLUSION
Federal judges should use two tests to determine the reliability of
an unavailable witness's grand jury testimony under Rule 804(b)(5).
Use of the procedural test would protect defendants from unreliable
grand jury testimony containing inadmissible hearsay or elicited
through leading questions or prosecutorial threats. Use of the corrobo-
rative test would ensure that independent evidence supports the truth of
any grand jury testimony admitted under 804(b) (5).
The two tests would ensure that grand jury testimony admitted at
trial under 804(b) (5) contains "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthi-
ness" equivalent to other 804(b) hearsay exceptions. The tests also
would ensure that grand jury testimony admitted at trial under
804(b) (5) does not violate the defendant's sixth amendment right of con-
frontation. Finally, the tests would contribute to the growth of the law
of evidence by permitting the jury to consider reliable grand jury testi-
mony as substantive evidence in its determination of the defendant's in-
nocence or guilt.
PATRICK S. CASEY
the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly
determined."
129 1 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 36, 1 102[01], at 102-5 to 102-16; Advisory Com-
mittee's Notes, supra note 22, at 289 (the relevant text of which is at supra note 74), 323 (Rule
804(b)(5) "expresses preferences: testimony given on the stand in person is preferred over
hearsay, and hearsay, if of the specified quality, is preferred over complete loss of the evidence
of the declarant"); see 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, at § 1420.
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